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Terrorismoaren aurkako gerra orokorraren ondorioak –2001eko irailaren 11az geroztikakoak–
aztertzen ditut lan honetan. Errealismo politikoak, porrot egin duen indarkerian oinarrituriko
estrategia mantentzearen egokitasuna ongi pentsatzea eskatzen duelakoan nago. Murgildurik
gauden giro honetan, terrorismoarekin loturiko kulturatzat hartzen direnen aurkako giroan alegia,
indarkeria uzteari uko egiteak herri txikien funtsezko balioak –horien hizkuntza eta kultura–
ahultzeko arriskua dakar.
Giltza-Hitzak: Irailak 11. Terrorismoa. ETA. Al-Qaeda. Errealismoa. Indarkeria eta kultura
txikiak.
Examino las consecuencias de la guerra global contra el terror después del 11 de
Septiembre de 2001. Mantengo que el realismo político requiere sopesar el acierto de continuar
con una estrategia fracasada en base a la violencia. La negativa de abandonar la violencia corre
el riesgo de socavar los valores básicos de los pueblos minoritarios –sus idiomas y culturas– en un
clima de oposición mundial a culturas percibidas como vinculadas al terrorismo.
Palabras Clave: 11 de Septiembre. Terrorismo. ETA. Al-Qaeda. Realismo. Violencia y culturas
minoritarias.
J’examine les conséquences de la guerre globale contre la terreur après le 11 septembre
2001. Je maintiens que le réalisme politique doit évaluer la nécessité de continuer une stratégie
ratée basée sur la violence. Le refus d’abandonner la violence courre le risque d’affaiblir les
valeurs de base des peuples minoritaires –leurs langues et leurs cultures– dans un climat
d’opposition mondiale aux cultures que l’on considère comme étant liées au terrorisme.
Mots Clés: 11 septembre. Terrorisme. ETA. Al-Qaeda. Réalisme. Violence et cultures
minoritaires.
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“We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.”
J.R.R. Tolkien
The Return of the King
I would like to begin by thanking the Northern Basque Section (Iparralde)
of the Association Eusko Ikaskuntza, as well as its president, Jean-Claude
Larronde, for their kind invitation to address you today. I am very touched by
his welcome and the honor that you all demonstrate by your presence here
this afternoon. I find myself today among the Basque intellectual aristocracy
of Iparralde. It is in moments like these that I find myself thinking of those
who have left us, among them Chanoine Pierre Lafitte, Eugen Goyheneche,
Abbe Pierre Larzabal and Marc Legasse. This generation owes them a tre-
mendous debt for their tireless devotion to the Basque people, their culture,
their language and their politics.
The last time that I had the honor of addressing such a gathering of
Basque colleagues and friends was nearly ten years ago at the time of the
publication of my book, The Hills of Conflict; Basque Nationalism in France,
by the University of Nevada Press2. In the intervening years, the issue of
nationalism and ethnic militancy has been eclipsed by the rise of global
terrorism and political violence. Using the Basque case and others, I would
like to examine “Some Unexpected Consequences of the Worldwide War
Against Terrorism.”3.
There are moments which mark our collective consciences and which
represent for good or for worse the emotional markers of our age. For the
Basques, among those events were most certainly the Spanish Civil War, the
German bombardment of Guernica, and the Franco years. In the north, Bas-
que memory was marked by the crisis of separation of Church and State, the
German occupation, the resistance and then liberation, and still later by the
intellectual impact of the crisis of decolonization on France and her people.
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For the people of the United States, there are also certain events
which mark the collective and operational memory of my people as well.
For recent generations, there have been events which have left their traces
like the wood sculptures carved by Basque shepherds in the American
west, or like the living sculptures carved in stone by Chillida along the sea
shore in Donostia.
Among these memory-searing events for the Americans are: 1) the attack
on Pearl Harbor in 1941; 2) the birth of the atomic age; 3) the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy in 1963; and 4) most recently the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. The appearance of terrorism on American
soil profoundly shocked the American public and galvanized the reaction of
the American government and its allies against the new threat of terrorism.
In the aftermath of the cold war, and the fall of communism, terrorism beca-
me one of the new priorities of American foreign policy.
If you will permit me several reflections on the nature of contemporary
American politics, it may help explain the American political and emotional
reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath. The
genius of American democracy is that, in its wisdom, anyone may be elected
President of the United States. George W. Bush, despite being a graduate of
Yale University, boasts of not being an intellectual and it is to his credit that
he knows it. Neither is he cosmopolitan and he is proud of that as well. In
truth, President Bush, at the time of his election, had not traveled outside the
United States but three times in his life before being elected president. He is
representative of many within his political generation and his party. For exam-
ple, in the American Congressional (legislative) elections of 1990, fifty percent
of the newly elected members of Congress had never owned a passport.
However, and to their credit, President Bush and his political allies are
men of strong convictions, both political and religious. This mixture of reli-
gious, political and ideological beliefs influences their view of the outside
world, and has guided them in their actions these last years.
The events of September 11 have served in part to confirm part of their
convictions about the larger world, and at the same time to serve as an
agent of change by forcing a rapid and new global engagement on these ins-
tinctive neo-isolationists. This was a significant change from the words of
George Bush as he first campaigned for the presidency in 2000. What the
attacks of September 11 provoked was a kind of secular conversion expe-
rience in the President and the conservative right wing as they came to see
that American national security required both dependable allies and active
engagements abroad. In a Manichean manner, President Bush insisted that
in the war against terrorism, henceforth countries and peoples would be ei-
ther “with us” or “against us”. He even used the word “crusade” in speaking
of the challenge which he saw facing the U.S. and its allies immediately after
the attacks. The choice of the word “crusade” was later seen as a politically
unfortunate one which served to greatly agitate Arab public opinion for whom
the word provokes painful historical memories of occupation and domination.
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The conceptual problem with President Bush’s perspective is his effort to
define the world of the United States and its allies in stark and uncompromi-
sing colors. As we know, the world in which we live is rarely unmistakably
black or white. Politics and diplomacy exist most often in an ambiguous
world painted in various shades of grey.
In the aftermath of September 11, I see certain results that I believe
were largely unexpected in the mobilization against terrorism. The subse-
quent diplomatic initiatives that emerged as the west mobilized against this
terrorist threat have brought with them consequences that have been unex-
pected for many peoples and movements around the world, among them the
Basques. Many of these peoples and movements had nothing to do with Al
Qaeda or Islamic fundamentalism at all. Yet, the reaction to these terrorist
attacks is telling. For, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, the politi-
cal behavior of diverse countries –especially some of America’s closest
allies– invites us to draw certain, perhaps surprising, lessons. Let me exami-
ne some of those lessons by making reference to the perspective of the Eas-
tern philosopher, Kautilya, and interpreting his ideas in light of contemporary
international relations. Kautilya’s original formulation held that:
A friend of a friend is a friend;
A friend of an enemy is an enemy;
An enemy of a friend is an enemy;
An enemy of an enemy is a friend.
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, a number of conclu-
sions may be drawn about contemporary international relations and the
behavior of states and alliances.
1) A friend isn’t necessarily a friend. This is notably the case with cer-
tain countries in Western Europe and the Middle East. The fact that the last
legislative elections in Germany unfolded in a climate of accelerating anti-
Americanism reeked of the basest political opportunism by both of the major
German political parties. Their self-serving pandering to the German electora-
te did not pass unperceived in Washington. Speaking of the behavior of the
German chancellor in the elections, the response of U.S. Secretary of Defen-
se Donald Rumsfeld was typical when he described U.S.-German relations as
“poisoned”. For the first time in recent memory, following the German elec-
tions, the German chancellor did not travel immediately to Paris to reaffirm
Germany’s historic commitment to Europe, but rather to London to ask Tony
Blair to intercede with the American administration to help repair U.S.-Ger-
man relations. It was after all, he insisted, only politics.
The behavior of Saudi Arabia also raises the question of what exactly
friendship is between countries. Lord Palmerston wrote in the nineteenth
century that “Countries have no friends, only interests”. Yet the United Sta-
tes has defined its foreign policy in certain regions of the world by a close
commonality of interests, and that has been the case with America’s historic
ties with Saudi Arabia. Successive U.S. administrations defined their rela-
Jacob, James E.: Some Unexpected Consequences of the Worldwide War Against Terrorism
540 Rev. int. estud. vascos. 48, 2, 2003, 537-550
tionship with Saudi Arabia as a kind of polar star in the firmament of the
Middle East. The U.S. looked to Saudi Arabia to moderate more radical Arab
regimes, and to control the price of OPEC oil.
At the same time, the internal pressures on the royal family of Saudi Ara-
bia, the house of Saud, have become increasingly complex. Faced with gro-
wing internal discontent, economic stagnation, and the end of oil revenues in
sight, the Saudis sought to quietly pursue their own national self-interest.
Specifically, they chose to play “both ends against the middle,” in defining
their national interest based on appeasement of both the United States and
Islamic radicals within the kingdom. Faced with the threat of Al Qaeda, the
attitude of some members of the royal family has been to play the political
ostrich, burying their head in the sand while world events swirled about
them. For others of the royal family, they chose to ally themselves more clo-
sely with the Wahhabi mullahs who were the source of the legitimacy of their
regime. The long refusal of the royal family to admit to the presence of Isla-
mic militants within the kingdom was clearly a case of face-saving denial.
Despite these denials, the attacks against the Khobar Towers in 1996 and
the recent attacks against foreign housing in Riyadh demonstrate the extent
of Al Qaeda influence among young Saudis of the Wahhabi sect. Fifteen of
the nineteen hijackers on September 11 were Wahhabi Saudis. The House of
Saud has come to realize that the greatest threat to its survival may be their
own Wahhabi allies.
In reality, from their perspective, circumstances obliged the Saudis to be
diplomatically deceitful in order to insure the survival of their regime. While
declaring themselves a close ally of the United States, the financial network
stretching between the Kingdom and Al Qaeda had become as well-establi-
shed as it was carefully hidden. It is now believed that the funds passed
from Saudi Arabia to Al Qaeda paymasters in Spain who used the money
not only to fund the preparations for the September 11 attacks, but also to
fund Al Qaeda’s operations in Europe. Two alternatives exist to explain why
this money flowed from Saudi Arabia to Bin Laden’s militants. One is the
call for charity that is one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith. Many reli-
gious Saudis fulfill this obligation, especially around the season of Rama-
dan, by contributing to Islamic charities that are active around the Islamic
world. Yet, many of these charities are allied with Osama bin Laden’s Al
Qaeda, and this is true of charities active in such countries as Bosnia, Alba-
nia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Chechnya and elsewhere in the Middle
East. For many contributors, this charity was a pious act based on the
tenets of their religious faith. For others, however, the religious call for chari-
table contributions permitted them to contribute to Bin Laden while out-
wardly professing naïve and plausible deniability. What is apparent is that
some of Saudi Arabia’s wealthiest families, including some members of the
royal family, have contributed to these Islamic charities and thus to Al
Qaeda. For some, it was a question of realpolitik: an effort to trade domes-
tic peace in the kingdom by supporting Bin Laden’s “charitable works”
elsewhere. In Bosnia alone, NATO raids on Saudi charities in 2001 found
computer hard drives that included both charitable documents as well as Al
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Qaeda plans for attacks on American and British targets. More recently, Ger-
many expelled a Saudi diplomat because of ongoing contacts between
Saudi diplomats and the Islamic fundamentalist milieu that contributed
several of the suicide attackers of September 11. Even the wife of Saudi
Ambassador Prince Bandar wrote checks that ultimately wound up in the
hands of some of the 9-11 hijackers. But Al Qaeda’s attacks within the king-
dom reveal that whatever understanding had been reached is now broken,
and with it the denial of Islamic radicalism threatening the regime.
The same sober question about intentions can be raised regarding Pakis-
tan, as well. Recent news reports raise the same question of how close, in
fact, is the commonality of interest between the United States and Pakistan.
It is now clear that Pakistan’s nuclear establishment has been responsible,
in association with the Chinese, for the greatest violations of the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty in post World War Two history. At the same time that
the government of General Musharrif was aiding the United States in its war
against terrorism, it is now clear that for much longer Pakistan had been sha-
ring nuclear technology with North Korea, Iran and Libya. It is impossible that
this occurred without the knowledge and approval of the Pakistani govern-
ment and military. Pakistan was in the position of offering half-hearted sup-
port in the war against terrorism (anything more would have destabilized their
regime), while at the same time offering nuclear technology to some of the
most dangerous regimes in the Middle East. In the case of Pakistan, as well,
a friend isn’t necessarily always a friend.
One of the greatest sources of a culture’s knowledge is to be found in
the folk expressions that capture, sometimes in an earthy manner, the
wisdom of our ancestors. I greatly profited from many Basque aphorisms
that appear in The Hills of Conflict. For our purposes, there is an American
colloquial expression that says that if it walks like a duck, and quacks like
a duck, then it’s a duck. Today, we have every reason to hold the definition
of “friendship” to higher standards. Supporting Al Qaeda or spreading
nuclear weapons to unstable states are acts of a hostile regime. These
regimes have a choice to make. They can’t rest straddling both sides of
the fence.
2) An enemy isn’t necessarily an enemy. Here we must consider the
example of France. In matters of diplomacy, it has been said there are two
types of friends: “fair weather” friends, and what have been called “foul
weather” friends. It is easy to be a fair weather friend. Here, there is little
cost to pay for a symbolic gesture of friendship. One sees in the “coalition
of the willing” that have lent their moral support to combat operations in
Iraq a certain number of countries, like Costa Rica, who can make the ges-
ture of solidarity at literally no cost. In other cases, countries have made a
deliberate choice in order to avoid paying later for their silence today. As
President Turgut Ozal of Turkey said in explaining Turkey’s support of the
U.S. in Desert Storm in 1991, Turkey had the opportunity to be on the win-
ning side for the first time in two hundred years, and they weren’t going to
miss the chance.
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Despite the diplomatic and political differences that separate France and
the United States over Iraq, my habit as an historian compels me to take a
longer perspective in time. In reality, France is the oldest friend of the United
States. Without the aid of France, the American Revolution would have
almost certainly failed. I remember standing on the walls of the fort in Pasa-
jes San Juan that was owned at the time by Marc Legasse and learning that
it was from there that the Marquis de Lafayette sailed to help fight in the
American Revolutionary War.
I consider France to be a friend of the United States, but it is clearly an
independent friend. For people as for states, among the greatest of friends
are those who tell you not what you want to hear, but the truth as they see
it, no matter how painful. Friendship is also a two-way street. My grandfat-
her fought on the side of France at Chateau Thierry in World War One. He
drove an ambulance there just as did Ernest Hemingway. My father was in
the Navy in World War Two. France fought with distinction at the side of the
United States in Desert Storm. France can also be counted on to intervene
in some of the most violent civil wars in Africa, and even Haiti, for humani-
tarian reasons. “Foul weather friends” are willing to pay a price for that
friendship.
The reality is that these two countries have much in common, and it is
perhaps this fact –how much we have in common– that is one of the sour-
ces of our current competition. As the Austro-Hungarian Empress Maria The-
resa once put it, “King Charles and I are in perfect agreement. We both
want Milan”. We conflict not because we are so different, but because we
are so much alike.
The foreign policy of both the United States and France is of a worldwide
scale, and conflict is often the rule in international relations. Fortunately, the
recent diplomatic bitterness over Iraq is already in the process of dimini-
shing. This is in the interest of the United States as well as of France. Anot-
her principle of classical diplomacy is to exclude no one permanently. Today’s
adversary may become tomorrow’s friend.
Having already discussed my view of the foreign policy of the American
administration, fairness obliges me to reflect on the style of recent French
foreign policy. Viewed from abroad, it seems that the French Minister of
Foreign Affairs, M. Dominique Villepin, took great pleasure in lecturing the
American administration. In doing so, he seemed sometimes to posture like
a martinet from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques or like a secular priest archly
castigating sinners. This hardly served the interest of France.
Nonetheless, as I have predicted, these clouds are going to disappear
because it is in the interest of both partners, as well as of the western allian-
ce. For those among you who think the closest allies of the United States will
be the Saudis or even the Russians, I have some ocean-front land at Ste.
Engrace in Soule that I would like to sell you. An enemy isn’t necessarily
always an enemy.
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Some Unexpected Results of the World-wide War Against Terrorism
This leads me to the central question, and that is the extent of the world
alliance against terrorism and its unexpected results. Currently, almost one
hundred and sixty countries have associated in some manner with the world-
wide campaign against terrorism. Among the elements of this cooperation
are much closer coordination in matters of police work and intelligence. Cer-
tainly, one of the most important aspects of this worldwide campaign is the
United Nations accord to follow and interrupt the international financial net-
works of terrorist movements. Follow the money, find the movement.
This diplomatic success is based on a rational calculation of national
self-interest. Between Bin Laden and the unified community of sovereign sta-
tes (including those who are the greatest contributors of aid to countries in
the process of development), there is really no choice to make, even for
those who can barely disguise their sympathy for Islamic fundamentalism, or
for the instability of the current international order. A rational calculation of
self-interest has led the overwhelming majority of countries to sign on to this
new world order under the guise of the war against terrorism. Some coun-
tries like Syria stand out by their silence, although even Syria has quietly
aided the west in its struggle against Al Qaeda. Libya is perhaps the best
example of a country which has fundamentally changed direction based on a
rethinking of its self-interest. This began with admitting blame for the dow-
ning of Pan Am 103 over Scotland and the UTA flight over Niger. Payments to
the families appear now to be bringing these cases to a close. Even more
surprising was Libya’s recent decision to give up its nuclear weapons pro-
gram which we now know was greatly aided by Pakistan’s nuclear establish-
ment. As a result, Libya may be the first country to be removed from the U.S.
State Department’s list of foreign state sponsors of terrorism.
It may come as some surprise that as of the present moment, Spain is
the European country that has arrested the greatest number of Al Qaeda mili-
tants on its soil. The result is that the Bush administration made no secret
of both its support and its gratitude to the Aznar administration in Spain. The
American administration was grateful to Spain not only for its domestic
efforts in disrupting Al Qaeda, but also because Aznar was, along with Bri-
tain’s Tony Blair and the President of Poland, among the few European lea-
ders to publicly and vocally support the U.S. and to risk the domestic
political fallout from their support of combat in Iraq. American appreciation of
Spain’s role in the war on terrorism has continued with the arrival of Spanish
troops in Iraq. The result has been a closer friendship between the U.S. and
Spain. According to The New York Times, the Bush administration, in order to
demonstrate its gratitude, furnished intelligence to Madrid that helped them
to dismantle the Donostia commando of ETA.
American interest in the stability of Spain is of long duration. The entry of
Spain into NATO only reinforced the position of Spain as one of the pillars of
democratic Europe. Despite the level of domestic terrorism in Spain, the
case of ETA was considered on the other side of the Atlantic as essentially
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an internal question for Spain, and a problem that appeared to be coming
under the control of the Spanish government. But the arrival of Al Qaeda mili-
tants on Spanish soil suddenly increased the importance of Spain in the
worldwide campaign against terrorism. At this time, there was a marked simi-
larity between the lists of the world’s most important terrorist movements
compiled by both the United States and the European Union.
The arrest, however, of IRA and ETA militants in Colombia who were trai-
ning FARC guerrillas in the making of bombs changed ETA from a European
regional movement to what the U.S. now considered a terrorist movement of
worldwide import. Thirty years after the decision made by ETA militants to not
assassinate Henry Kissinger at the same time that they killed Admiral Carre-
ro Blanco in Operation Ogro, ETA finally found itself on America’s list of the
world’s major terrorist threats.
Viewed in context, the question of ETA still remains more important as a
domestic threat to Spain. But its mingling in the instability of Colombian
society was a serious misstep given the importance of terrorism in Colombia
to the United States. As one of the largest sources of drugs to the U.S.,
Colombia in 2004 is the third largest recipient of American military assistan-
ce worldwide. At the same time, in 2001, fully eight-five percent of all anti-
American terrorist attacks in the world took place in Colombia. Most were
bombings carried out by FARC, especially against oil and gas pipelines there.
Anyone training FARC in bomb-making moved to a higher threat level to the
United States and not just its allies. As Kautilya wrote, “The friend of my
enemy is my enemy. The enemy of my friend is my enemy”.
An additional result of the war against terrorism is that it has furthered
the process of globalization by denying the legitimacy of minority cultures and
languages identified with terrorism. The judgment that one makes on terro-
rism varies depending on your perspective. The role of violence by irregulars,
or “citizen soldiers”, was key to the success of the American Revolution. Yet,
British Major General William Gates, Commander of the British Army in the
colonies, called the “Minutemen” “assassins” and he promised to hang
them without delay. Yet, in American history, these citizen soldiers are consi-
dered as the fathers of American liberty. But history is written by the win-
ners, and words and symbols serve the interests of power. I leave aside the
question of the morality of violence in order to consider the question of its
efficacy. Does violence serve to help or hinder the cause that embraces it?
Violence represents –in the worst of cases– an attack against the stability
and the legitimacy of states, as well as their survival. It is for this reason
that we can well understand the hostile reaction against any movement that
attempts to use the armed struggle in order to overthrow an existing state.
This leads us to certain conclusions about violence as a tool of politics:
1) It puts at risk the legitimate expression of other cultural and linguistic
initiatives. Violence represents what in English is called “a reverse
halo effect”. It contaminates all other initiatives in its wake. Rather
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than encouraging the rise of moderate ethnic elites, violence of the
type used by ETA threatens to contaminate the idea of Basque identity
in Spanish politics. ETA’s threat in 2004 to conduct a broad campaign
against Spain’s summer tourist industry is the economic equivalent of
a “scorched earth” offense, and has invited the Spanish government
to reply in kind. At the same time, widespread criticism greeted ETA’s
recent announcements of a truce with Catalonia, after talks with Cata-
lan leaders. This is an odd offer, at best, since ETA’s previous attacks
against Catalan targets in Barcelona (including a working class super-
market) were greeted with universal condemnation, and still serve as
examples of some of ETA’s worst targeting decisions since its crea-
tion.
2) Violence rarely succeeds in changing the politics of the government.
Certainly, there are notable exceptions, including the IRA or the African
National Congress in South Africa. In the case of the IRA, it’s the
length and force of the violence used by the republican movement
–and this despite a century of efforts by the British government– that
finally led the two camps to the negotiating table. By contrast, despite
more than 800 deaths since 1968, ETA has never succeeded in crea-
ting a sufficient level of violence to force the Spanish government to
the bargaining table. On the other hand, successive Spanish adminis-
trations have chosen to define this as a question of honor, and hence
are unwilling to make the slightest concession that might lead to a
permanent end of hostilities. To use another example, despite an offi-
cial policy that denies the success of Palestinian violence, Israel
knows that any “road map” to peace must lead through negotiation
with moderate Palestinian leaders. That is the only hope for marginali-
zing the terrorists and achieving a durable peace and an end to this
ceaseless pyrrhic war.
Yet, in most cases, violence does not succeed in achieving its own
goals. Moreover, in many cases it serves to internally fragment the
movement and render it vulnerable to the incessant pressure of the
state. Most often, violence invites a crushing retaliation by the state,
and the defeat of the movement can be measured from the time it
begins a campaign of violence targeting the state.
3) To be legitimate, violence must, at a minimum, be supported by the
community from which the movement emerges. In truth, Basque public
opinion is highly conflicted by ETA’s violence, and ETA’s electoral sco-
res reflect the rejection of violence by a majority of the Basque electo-
rate. For true popular support entails a threshold that is well above
the ten to fifteen percent that ETA and its allies have traditionally
polled. As Mao Zedong said of successful insurgencies, the guerrilla
must swim as a fish in water. To be precise, for any insurgent move-
ment to be legitimate –not to speak of its eventual potential success–
it must envelop itself in the popular support of the people. In the case
of ETA, it appears that nothing it does can substantially increase its
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electoral support beyond its bedrock supporters. But demonstrations
of tens of thousands of Basques protesting ETA violence send a world-
wide message. Vox populi, vox dei. Any movement that ignores this fun-
damental political maxim does so at its peril. The voice of the people
is the voice of the gods.
Since September 11, one can identify a number of results that affect
diverse minority groups and cases. Those groups, like ETA, which are hence-
forth identified as being a “worldwide threat” are targeted today as never
before in their history. In the case of ETA, the forces arrayed against them
include the institutions of Spain, France, the European Union, the United
Nations, and now the global coalition assembled by the United States. In
such circumstances, the violence of a movement without great public sup-
port risks contaminating the jewels of a minority people –their language and
their culture. In such a circumstance, it remains for moderate and non-violent
elites to defend these cultural treasures against an onslaught which risks de-
legitimizing historic Basque cultural symbols. In the case of the Basques, the
threat is to a language and cultural tradition that stretches back before recor-
ded history. At the same time, the inability of ETA to win substantial public
support uncouples violence from previous political goals as violence beco-
mes increasingly a goal in and of itself as the movement spirals downward
into nihilism. The challenge of Basque politics in this climate is to demons-
trate the value of being abertzale while rejecting the use of violence.
The second category of minority groups and peoples who are now targe-
ted by the struggle against terrorism are those who are identified with Al
Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism in general. There may be as many as forty
such movements worldwide. Among the most important in this second cate-
gory are the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat, the Kurdish move-
ment Al Ansar al Islam, the Chechen movement in Russia, diverse movements
in Pakistan, the remnants of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Jemaah Islamiyya
in Southeast Asia. In each of these cases, there is an overt and proud identifi-
cation with the ideological and social theses of Bin Laden.
There are still other groups like the Front for the Liberation of Eastern
Turkmenistan in Western China whose appearance on the list of worldwide
movements seems more a gesture to reward positive behavior by China than
a reflection of the threat posed by this small group, itself. In the Philippines,
the Abu Sayyaf group, a small band of perhaps a hundred militants, saw
itself transformed by the press from a group of kidnappers for ransom into
an Islamic militant group affiliated with Al Qaeda. In truth, Abu Sayyaf has
greatly troubled the whole kidnapping industry in the Philippines by attracting
the attention of both the Philippine and U.S. governments. In these two
cases, the link with Al Qaeda is less evident and serves to give to the move-
ments an importance that they often don’t deserve.
For each of these two larger categories of movements –those who are
part of the network of Al Qaeda, and those who have no ties to Al Qaeda but
who have been caught up in the worldwide campaign against terrorism– the
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events of September 11 have changed their futures. Regardless of ties to Al
Qaeda or not, any movement that threatens the stability of one of the allian-
ce of anti-terrorist states will attract attention as never before. This atten-
tion, perhaps once flattering, will be fatal for many of these movements.
CONCLUSIONS
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, the level of coo-
peration between states in combating terrorism has greatly increased. As of
today, more than 160 countries have signed up in the worldwide war against
terrorism. Some have done so half-heartedly, or with the confidence that little
tangible will be asked of them. For other countries, the stakes are much gre-
ater. Al Qaeda cells may currently exist in as many as forty countries, many
of which have indigenous terrorist movements of their own. It is because of
this worldwide coalition of governments targeting terrorism that there have
been unexpected consequences for other movements and peoples without
ties to Al Qaeda themselves. The countries that have joined this crusade
have constituted themselves as a kind of private club. The list of priority
terrorist targets changes with time. Each country has the right to propose its
own targets, including its own internal adversaries. ETA saw itself inscribed
on the list of movements of a worldwide threat for two reasons –in response
to actions by Spain and France in influencing European Union policy, and as a
result of their ill-advised ties by ETA and the IRA in aiding FARC in Colombia.
This served to move ETA from the column of domestic nuisance in Spain to a
movement of greater potential threat.
Among the groups who have embraced the armed struggle are ethnic
minorities like the Basques, Corsicans, Kurds, Chechens, and Tamils who
have a national identity and linguistic and cultural demands. Their long histo-
ries are also the histories of neglect and rejection of their demands by exis-
ting states. Violence comes to appear the best or last strategy for gaining
leverage on the policy-making institutions of states.
The tragedy of this political choice is that it is the embrace of violence
which serves to contaminate the cultural demands in these cases, and to mar-
ginalize more moderate ethnic elites. This is the case of the Basque move-
ment, especially in Iparralde, where among the most visible leaders are those
who reject violence on a personal level, but who often have refused to criticize
the decision of others (read “ETA” or “Iparretarrak”) to use violence, themsel-
ves. This refusal has led the Spanish and French governments to interpret this
refusal to condemn violence as a demonstration of support for the armed
camp. This explains, in part, the action taken by France against Enbata in the
1970’s, and most recently the actions taken by France and Spain against Bata-
suna and other political parties considered as spokesmen for ETA in the man-
ner of the double face of the IRA and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland.
The lessons of history are unforgiving: the embrace of violence as a tool
by sub-national groups is most often doomed to defeat. In the history of the
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twentieth century, the fate of most terrorist movements is an ignominious
and often ignored end. Most are small movements in numbers and die a
quiet death. In most cases, it is not simply that violence represents a tacti-
cal dead end, but more importantly, it is a strategic error as the Red Army
Faction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy later admitted. It would be
one thing if violence served only to discredit the movements who embrace it.
But the danger of the armed struggle is that in the current world situation,
violence serves to contaminate other cultural and linguistic goals, and thus
to menace the crown jewels –the true treasure of a people that is their lan-
guage and culture. Violence intervenes at an historical moment when mino-
rity languages and cultures are already targeted by the crushing logic of
assimilation and uniformity which are bi-products of an inexorable process of
globalization that is already underway. In these cases, the steamroller which
is globalization can destroy indigenous cultures and traditions whose rich-
ness serves to define the diversity of the human space. We are lessened by
their loss.
The challenge remains to define a unified strategy for saving what is
essential to ethnic peoples –their language and the culture– as the inheritan-
ce of subsequent generations. Basque autonomy will happen in the context
of an inevitable European federalism or it won’t happen at all. But the worst
would be to witness the contamination of the cultural essence of a people by
the ill-advised choice of violence in this generation. It is to eat the seed corn
of future generations to come.
I leave the question of the morality of violence to philosophers and theo-
logians. I am a political scientist, and what concerns me is the efficacy of
violence as a political tactic. In reality, violence has never served as an ins-
trument of unification for the abertzale camp. Even worse, the use of violen-
ce has served to fracture the Basque movement. The protest marches
against ETA’s violence that the world has seen in the South clearly demons-
trates that there is an internal dynamic of fragmentation in the heart of the
Basque people which has been caused by ETA’s violence. In the case where
violence serves to distance the abertzale movement from the Basque peo-
ple, it becomes counter-productive. In such circumstances, if it continues,
one must ask if we are not seeing the descent of violence from a rational –if
incorrect– strategy toward nihilism. In the view of the nihilists (a word which
shares the same root as the verb “to annihilate”, a reasoned political stra-
tegy is replaced by the skeptical belief that nothing has value, and that
everything should be destroyed. In contrast with younger and more idealistic
movements in their ideological development, for the nihilist, violence beco-
mes the goal of political action, not a tool but now an end in and of itself.
Thus the movement becomes seduced by what the nineteenth century anar-
chists called “the propaganda of the deed”.
This is why in the war against terrorism, the cultural consequences are
more important than ever before. In an epoch when the success of violence
is now cast in doubt, it remains for the people to make their wishes known.
As Renan put it, the nation is a daily plebescite. With the worldwide decline
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of minority languages, well-meaning people can no longer afford the luxury of
silence faced with the survival of their culture. For the Spanish government,
they must demonstrate the political courage to legitimate moderate elites
and make concessions that will not only undercut the violent minority, but
also prevent the rise of a new generation with grievances born of today’s
policy errors.
The most enigmatic of Chinese curses says, “May you live in interesting
times”. This is certainly the era in which we live today. Our future is an uncer-
tain one. Terrorism, globalization, and the disappearance of cultural patrimo-
nies are all signs of our age. They are the markers of a process of inevitable
political and cultural change. Faced with the future which they represent, they
oblige us to make realistic decisions about terrorism and political violence,
or else to accept the consequences of the error of our ways.
The text of this article was written and under editorial review by RIEV at
the time the Madrid train bombings took place in March, 2004, and for that
reason they are not discussed in this article.
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